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The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement

19 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2014  

Vivek Ghosal

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)

D. Daniel Sokol

University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

Date Written: February 14, 2014

Abstract

Antitrust as a whole was transformed due in large part to the influential writings of Bork in The Antitrust Paradox (1978). This paper examines what Bork said and did not say about cartel enforcement and offers an examination of how actual the structure of cartel enforcement played out relative to what Bork advocated. To provide some perspective on Bork’s view of cartel enforcement, we compare his views to those of the other major influential antitrust book of the time by Posner (1976). We identify three distinctive stages of cartel enforcement. Stage one is characterized by low number of cartels prosecuted along with low fines and jail terms. Consistent with Bork’s vision, Stage two demonstrates a significant increase in cartels prosecuted, although fines and jail terms remain low. Stage three (the current stage) exemplifies a decline in the number of cartels prosecuted relative to stage two, but with dramatic increases in monetary fines and jail terms.

Keywords: cartels, enforcement, prosecutions, antitrust, leniency, fines, jail terms

JEL Classification: K21, L41, L13, L11

Suggested Citation

Ghosal, Vivek and Sokol, D. Daniel, The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement (February 14, 2014). Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2345983

Vivek Ghosal

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute ( email )

110 8th Street
Troy, NY 12180
United States
518-276-3868 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.rpi.edu/pl/people/ghosal

Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol

George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )

200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

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