Second Thoughts on Free Riding

27 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2013

See all articles by Ulrik Nielsen

Ulrik Nielsen

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Jean-Robert Tyran

University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Erik Wengström

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 4, 2013

Abstract

We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.

Keywords: Response Time, Free Riding, Public Goods, Experiment

JEL Classification: C70, C90, D03

Suggested Citation

Nielsen, Ulrik and Tyran, Jean-Robert and Wengström, Erik, Second Thoughts on Free Riding (September 4, 2013). Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 13-08. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2346832 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2346832

Ulrik Nielsen (Contact Author)

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark

Jean-Robert Tyran

University of Vienna ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/jean-robert.tyran/

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark
+45 353 23 027 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/tyran/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Erik Wengström

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/wengstrom

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