Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge

Posted: 9 Aug 2000

See all articles by Claude d'Aspremont

Claude d'Aspremont

Catholic University of Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Sudipto Bhattacharya

London School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)

Abstract

We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge between two participants in an R&D race for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licence fee schedules that are functions of the amount of knowledge disclosed, by the leading to the lagging agent, are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes and varying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure. In her sequential-offers bargaining games, the uninformed buyer is able to elicit full disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type of the licensor, and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminating knowledge licensee.

JEL Classification: C78, O31

Suggested Citation

Daspremont, Claude and Bhattacharya, Sudipto and Gerard-Varet (deceased), Louis-Andre, Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 67, No. 2, April 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=234814

Claude Daspremont

Catholic University of Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium
32 10 474335 (Phone)

Sudipto Bhattacharya (Contact Author)

London School of Economics ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
44 171 955 7320 (Phone)
44 171 955 7420 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet (deceased)

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)

N/A

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