Executive Compensation and Gender: S&P 1500 Listed Firms

Posted: 2 Nov 2013

See all articles by João Paulo Vieito

João Paulo Vieito

Scholl of Business Studies - Polytechnic Instituto of Viana do Castelo

Walayet A. Khan

University of Evansville

Date Written: April 1, 2012


We examine if a gender gap persists in executive compensation and if the composition and the determinants of executive compensation for men versus women are the same for the S&P1500 listed firms during the period from 1992 to 2004. This analysis is also extended to high tech firms, where high scholarship is required both for male and female executives. The results reveal that the gender gap in executive compensation is reducing essentially after the year 2000. Also, the factors that explain the variation in executive compensation are not all the same for men and women. However, firms continue to pay women, who are considered more risk averse than men, a similar proportion of risky compensation components, such as stock options and restricted stocks, than they pay to men. In terms of technology firms, we find that the gender differences in total compensation are not statistically significant. Our study offers insight into recent data for executive compensation. The finding that the gender gap diminishes is a sign of a better functioning market for executives. Our findings could be potentially useful for compensation committees in order to develop compensation packages that take into consideration the degree of risk aversion in order to enhance performance. Compensation adjusted for risk aversion can produce a higher level of satisfaction for the employees and can lead to better performances. Future research should focus on international comparison of various dimensions of executive compensation.

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Gender, Technology Firms

Suggested Citation

Vieito, João Paulo and Khan, Walayet A., Executive Compensation and Gender: S&P 1500 Listed Firms (April 1, 2012). Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348827

João Paulo Vieito (Contact Author)

Scholl of Business Studies - Polytechnic Instituto of Viana do Castelo ( email )

Avenida Miguel Dantas
Valença, 4930

Walayet A. Khan

University of Evansville ( email )

School of Business Admin 1800 Lincoln Avenue
Evansville, IN 47722
United States
812-479-2869 (Phone)
812-479-2872 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics