Corporate Performance: Does Board Independence Matter? Indian Evidence

International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 26(1), 185-200

Posted: 6 Nov 2013 Last revised: 24 Sep 2018

See all articles by Arunima Haldar

Arunima Haldar

S.P. Jain Institute of Management and Research

Reeta Shah

SJMSOM, IIT Bombay

S.V.D. Nageswara Rao

Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Bombay - Shailesh J. Mehta School of Management (SJM)

Peter Stokes

University of Chester

Dilek Demirbas

Istanbul University

Ali Dardour

Associate Professor

Date Written: January 4, 2018

Abstract

This paper attempts to examine the efficacy of the presence of independent board directors on financial performance in India.The study utilised panel regression models on large listed Indian firms to investigate the impact on financial performance due to the presence of independent directors.The findings suggest that independent board directors in Indian contexts do not significantly affect financial performance.The study has implications for the formulation of regulation related to appointment of independent directors and the extent of their representation on the board for them to be effective. The proportion of independent directors on the board of the firm is influenced by the trade-off between the cost of having independent directors on the board versus the benefits to the firm and society. Impact of independent director on financial performance in highly concentrated ownership remains ambiguous.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Independence, Financial Performance, India

JEL Classification: G30, M40

Suggested Citation

Haldar, Arunima and Shah, Reeta and Nageswara Rao, S. V. D. and Stokes, Peter and Demirbas, Dilek and Dardour, Ali, Corporate Performance: Does Board Independence Matter? Indian Evidence (January 4, 2018). International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 26(1), 185-200, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2350561

Arunima Haldar (Contact Author)

S.P. Jain Institute of Management and Research ( email )

Munshi Nagar, Dadabhai Road
Andheri West
Mumbai, Maharashtra 119579
India

Reeta Shah

SJMSOM, IIT Bombay ( email )

Powai
Mumbai, Maharashtra 400076
India

S. V. D. Nageswara Rao

Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Bombay - Shailesh J. Mehta School of Management (SJM) ( email )

Powai
Mumbai 400076
India
91-22-25767789 (Phone)
91-22-25722872 (Fax)

Peter Stokes

University of Chester

Chester
United Kingdom

Dilek Demirbas

Istanbul University ( email )

34459 Istanbul
Turkey

Ali Dardour

Associate Professor ( email )

680 cours de Libération
Talence, Nouvelle Aquitaine 33405
France

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