Negotiation between Authority and Polluters - Model for Support of Decision-Making in Environmental Policy: Principles and Experimental Case Test

28 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2000

See all articles by Petr Sauer

Petr Sauer

University of Economics, Prague

Antonin Dvorak

University of Economics, Prague

Petr Fiala

University of Economics, Prague

Date Written: 2000

Abstract

The paper describes a relatively new approach to pollution reduction problem solving that relies on negotiation between polluters and authorities in which traditional economic tools of environmental policies are used and where there is the economic information asymmetry between the polluters and the authority. The approach can result in negotiated voluntary environmental agreements between authorities and polluters. Design and results of a laboratory environmental policy experiment on air pollution reduction in a city are presented in the paper to illustrate the efficacy of the suggested approach. The case is created based on field data. A step toward a verification of the hypothesis of a possibility to establish the suggested approach as a new institution for environmental pollution management in practice is the most important result. The case also shows the usefulness of laboratory environmental policy experiments both for research and teaching. Some problems of practical applications of this kind of environmental policy tool mix are also discussed in the paper.

Keywords: environmental policy, voluntary environmental agreements, laboratory environmental policy experiment, air pollution

JEL Classification: Q25, Q28, C99

Suggested Citation

Sauer, Petr and Dvorak, Antonin and Fiala, Petr, Negotiation between Authority and Polluters - Model for Support of Decision-Making in Environmental Policy: Principles and Experimental Case Test (2000). FEEM Working Paper No. 33.2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=235081 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.235081

Petr Sauer (Contact Author)

University of Economics, Prague ( email )

W. Churchilla 4
Prague 3, 130 67
Czech Republic
+420 2 2409 5298 (Phone)

Antonin Dvorak

University of Economics, Prague

nam. W.Churchilla 4
Prague 3, 130 67
Czech Republic

Petr Fiala

University of Economics, Prague

W. Churchilla 3
Department of Econometrics
130 67 Prague 3
Czech Republic

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