Mergers and Acquisitions in Maritime Industry

Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 61, 2014, pp 212-234

45 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2013 Last revised: 2 Feb 2014

See all articles by George Alexandrou

George Alexandrou

Kingston University - School of Accounting and Finance

Dimitrios Gounopoulos

University of Bath

Hardy M. Thomas

University of Essex

Date Written: November 20, 2013

Abstract

In a comprehensive study of all shipping mergers and acquisitions since 1984 we document that the shareholders of both acquirer and target realize average abnormal gains of 1.2% and 3.3% respectively and both parties gain more from diversifying than focus-increasing deals. We find that acquirers gain more when paying with stock, in cross-border deals and from public targets while larger acquirers destroy wealth. The results indicate that targets gain more from cross-border and focus-increasing deals. We study the impact of regulatory interventions on the marginal propensity to merge among shipping firms and find significant differences across regions.

Keywords: Takeovers, Mergers, Shipping, Abnormal returns, Wealth effects

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Alexandrou, George and Gounopoulos, Dimitrios and Thomas, Hardy Mathew, Mergers and Acquisitions in Maritime Industry (November 20, 2013). Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 61, 2014, pp 212-234. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2351061 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2351061

George Alexandrou

Kingston University - School of Accounting and Finance ( email )

United Kingdom

Dimitrios Gounopoulos (Contact Author)

University of Bath ( email )

School of Management,
Wessex House, Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

Hardy Mathew Thomas

University of Essex ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom
44 01 206-873415 (Phone)
44 1206-873429 (Fax)

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