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Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe

Department of European Legal Studies Research Paper in Law, 07/2013

In 15 (7) German Law Journal 171 (2014)

35 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2013 Last revised: 1 Apr 2015

Michal Bobek

Independent

David Kosar

New York University School of Law

Date Written: November 7, 2013

Abstract

This article examines why, how, and with what results have judicial councils spread under the influence of European institutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the course of the last twenty years. It first traces back how the judicial councils, themselves just one possible form of administration of courts, have emerged as the recommended universal solution Europe-wide and internationally. Second, it discusses how has this model been exported under the patronage of European and international institutions to transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Assessing, thirdly, the reality of the functioning of such new judicial councils in these countries, in particular in Slovakia and Hungary, with the Czech Republic without a judicial council providing a counter-example, it is suggested that their impact on further judicial and legal transition has been either questionable or outright disastrous. This brings, eventually, into question the legitimacy as well as the bare reasonableness of the entire process of European/international standards setting and their later marketing or in reality rather imposition onto the countries in transition.

Keywords: International standards; soft law; European Union; Council of Europe; administration of courts; judicial councils; court presidents; judges; Central and Eastern Europe; transition; law exportation

Suggested Citation

Bobek, Michal and Kosar, David, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe (November 7, 2013). Department of European Legal Studies Research Paper in Law, 07/2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2351299 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2351299

Michal Bobek (Contact Author)

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

David Kosar

New York University School of Law ( email )

22 Washington Square North
New York, NY 10011
United States

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