Incentives and Teacher Effort: Further Evidence from a Developing Country

45 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016 Last revised: 2 Jun 2020

See all articles by Hai-Anh Dang

Hai-Anh Dang

World Bank - Development Data Group (DECDG); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA); Global Labor Organization (GLO); Vietnam National University Ha Noi; Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS) - Centre for Analysis and Forecasting

Elizabeth King

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Elizabeth M. King

Brookings Institution

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 1, 2013

Abstract

Few would contest that teachers are a very important determinant of whether students learn in school and how to improve teacher performance has been the focus of much policy debate in rich and poor countries. This paper examines how incentives, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, correlate with teacher effort. Using school survey data from Lao PDR, we estimate new measures of teacher effort including the number of hours that teachers spend preparing for classes and teacher provision of private tutoring classes outside of class hours. Estimation results indicate that higher teacher effort is associated with non-pecuniary incentives such as greater teacher autonomy over teaching materials, and monitoring mechanism such as the existence of an active parent-teacher association and ability of school principals to dismiss teachers. Methodologically, this paper provides a detailed derivation of a simultaneous OLS-probit model with school random effects that can jointly estimate teacher work hours and tutoring provision.

Keywords: Educational Sciences, Educational Institutions & Facilities, Effective Schools and Teachers, Educational Populations, Education For All, Education for Development (superceded)

Suggested Citation

Dang, Hai-Anh H. and King, Elizabeth and King, Elizabeth M., Incentives and Teacher Effort: Further Evidence from a Developing Country (November 1, 2013). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6694, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2352104

Hai-Anh H. Dang (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Data Group (DECDG) ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/haianhhdang/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

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Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA) ( email )

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Vietnam National University Ha Noi ( email )

Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS) - Centre for Analysis and Forecasting ( email )

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Vietnam

Elizabeth King

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

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Washington, DC 20433
United States

Elizabeth M. King

Brookings Institution

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Washington, DC 20036
United States

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