Do Multiple Large Shareholders Play a Corporate Governance Role? Evidence from East Asia

35 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2013

See all articles by Najah Attig

Najah Attig

Saint Mary's University - Department of Finance & Management Science

Sadok El Ghoul

University of Alberta - Campus Saint-Jean

Omrane Guedhami

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business

Date Written: November 10, 2013

Abstract

We examine the governance role of multiple large shareholder structures (MLSS) to determine their valuation effects in a sample of 1,252 publicly traded firms from nine East Asian economies. We find that the presence, number, and size of multiple large shareholders are associated with a significant valuation premium. Our results also show that the identity of MLSS influences corporate value, and that the valuation effects of MLSS are more pronounced in firms with greater agency costs. Our results imply that MLSS play a valuable monitoring role in curbing the diversion of corporate resources.

Keywords: Corporate governance, Multiple large shareholders, Corporate valuation

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Attig, Najah and El Ghoul, Sadok and Guedhami, Omrane, Do Multiple Large Shareholders Play a Corporate Governance Role? Evidence from East Asia (November 10, 2013). Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2352677 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2352677

Najah Attig

Saint Mary's University - Department of Finance & Management Science ( email )

Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 3C3
Canada
902-491-8679 (Phone)

Sadok El Ghoul (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Campus Saint-Jean ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R3
Canada
780-465-8725 (Phone)
780-465-8760 (Fax)

Omrane Guedhami

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business ( email )

Columbia, SC
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
102
rank
246,979
Abstract Views
671
PlumX Metrics