35 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2013
Date Written: November 12, 2013
When economists talk about regulatory capture, they do not imply that regulators are corrupt or lack integrity. In fact, if regulatory capture was just due to illegal behavior, it would be easier to fight. Regulatory capture is so pervasive precisely because it is driven by standard economic incentives, which push even the most well-intentioned regulators to cater to the interest of the regulated. These incentives are built in their positions. Regulators depend upon the regulated for much of the information they need to do their job properly. This dependency creates a need to cater to the information providers. The regulated are also the only real audience of the regulators, since taxpayers have all the incentives to remain ignorant. Hence, the regulators’ on the job performance will be naturally defined with the regulated in mind, pushing the regulators to cater to the interest of the regulated. Finally, career incentives play a big role. The regulators human capital is highly industry specific and the best job for people holding that specific human capital are with the regulated. Hence, the desire to preserve future career options makes it difficult for the regulator not to cater to the regulated.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Zingales, Luigi, Preventing Economists' Capture (November 12, 2013). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 13-81. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2353489 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2353489
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