Subsidiarity and Robustness: Building the Adaptive Efficiency of Federal Systems

Abstract

Subsidiarity - a systemic predilection for locating authority at the most local level feasible - has long been admired for its ability to protect localized, diverse interests from the tyranny of a national majority. In this article I suggest a novel benefit of subsidiarity: it boosts the adaptive efficiency of federal systems. To remain relevant, federal systems must adapt to meet changing circumstances. The process of adaptation involves both pushing federalism's boundaries in search of improved national-state balance, and selecting beneficial changes and rejecting harmful ones, a job most efficiently conducted by a set of diverse, complementary safeguards. By drawing a distinction between policy subsidiarity and safeguard subsidiarity, I describe how each form of subsidiarity contributes to the process of constitutional adaptation and federal system robustness.

Keywords: federalism, evolutionary theory

JEL Classification: D78, H11