When Investment Law Takes Over: Towards a New Legal Regime to Regulate Asia Pacific's Submarine Cables Boom

University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 13-13

Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, vol. 29 (2013), pp. 1-24

39 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2013

See all articles by Paolo Vargiu

Paolo Vargiu

Leicester Law School, University of Leicester

Fiammetta Borgia

International Law at the University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Italy

Date Written: November 2013

Abstract

This paper addresses the appropriateness of the UNCLOS framework to provide effective protection for cables-related activities from a public international lawperspective. In the absence of an adequate legal framework provided by the Law of the Sea, it is suggested that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) represent one of the most suitable ways to guarantee effective security and protection for the laying of submarine cables. The bilateral approach proper of investment law will be proposed as a model to solve the problem of the protection of submarine cables in those parts of the sea where the sovereignty of a State is not limited by the rights of other States.

Keywords: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, Asia Pacific, Submarine Cables

Suggested Citation

Vargiu, Paolo and Borgia, Fiammetta, When Investment Law Takes Over: Towards a New Legal Regime to Regulate Asia Pacific's Submarine Cables Boom (November 2013). University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 13-13, Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, vol. 29 (2013), pp. 1-24, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2354590

Paolo Vargiu (Contact Author)

Leicester Law School, University of Leicester ( email )

University Road
Leicester LE1 7RH, LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/law/people/paolo-vargiu

Fiammetta Borgia

International Law at the University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Italy ( email )

Via di Tor Vergata
Rome, Lazio 00133
Italy

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