Conflicted Emotions Following Trust-Based Interaction

56 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2013 Last revised: 18 Aug 2015

See all articles by Eric Schniter

Eric Schniter

Chapman University - George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics - Economic Science Institute

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Timothy W. Shields

Chapman University - George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics; Chapman University - Economic Science Institute

Date Written: January 9, 2015

Abstract

We observed reports of conflicted (concurrent positive and negative) emotions activated after interactions in the Trust game. Our analyses reveal that activation of 20 emotional states following trust-based interaction is better explained by predictions derived from a multi-dimensional Recalibrational perspective than by predictions derived from two-dimensional Valence and Arousal perspectives. The Recalibrational perspective proposes that emotions are activated according to their functional features – for example, emotions help people achieve short or long-sighted goals by up or down-regulating behavioral propensities, whereas Valence and Arousal perspectives consider simpler hedonic dimensions lacking functional specificity. The Recalibrational perspective is also distinguished from the Valence and Arousal perspectives in that it predicts the possibility of conflicted emotions. We discuss the theoretical implications of having conflicted goals and the economic implications of having conflicted emotions.

Keywords: emotion, affect valence, Recalibrational theory, intrapsychic conflict, Trust game

JEL Classification: C73, C91, D87

Suggested Citation

Schniter, Eric and Sheremeta, Roman M. and Shields, Timothy W., Conflicted Emotions Following Trust-Based Interaction (January 9, 2015). Journal of Economic Psychology, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2354758 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2354758

Eric Schniter (Contact Author)

Chapman University - George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics - Economic Science Institute ( email )

One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/ericschniter/

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

Timothy W. Shields

Chapman University - George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics ( email )

One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States
714.289.2092 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/timothywshields/

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States

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