Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption?

60 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2013 Last revised: 7 Oct 2014

See all articles by David Abrams

David Abrams

University of Pennsylvania Law School

Ufuk Akcigit

University of Chicago - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR)

Jillian Grennan

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2013

Abstract

Prior work suggests that more valuable patents are cited more. Using novel revenue data for tens of thousands of patents held by non-practicing entities (NPEs), we find that the relationship between citations and value forms an inverted-U, with fewer citations at the high end of value than in the middle. We explain the inverted-U with a model of innovation that has productive and strategic patents. Empirically, we observe more strategic patents where the model predicts: among inventors in fields of rapid development and where divisional applications are employed. These findings have important implications for our understanding of growth, innovation, intellectual property policy, and patent valuation.

Suggested Citation

Abrams, David S. and Akcigit, Ufuk and Grennan, Jillian, Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption? (November 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19647, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2355653

David S. Abrams (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

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Ufuk Akcigit

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.ufukakcigit.com

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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Jillian Grennan

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

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Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States

Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative ( email )

215 Morris St., Suite 300
Durham, NC 27701
United States

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