Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption?

60 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2013 Last revised: 9 Mar 2022

See all articles by David Abrams

David Abrams

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Ufuk Akcigit

University of Chicago - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR)

Jillian Grennan

Santa Clara University, Leavey School of Business; Santa Clara University School of Law; University of California, Berkeley, Haas School of Business, Institue for Business and Social Impact

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Date Written: November 2013

Abstract

Prior work suggests that more valuable patents are cited more. Using novel revenue data for tens of thousands of patents held by non-practicing entities (NPEs), we find that the relationship between citations and value forms an inverted-U, with fewer citations at the high end of value than in the middle. We explain the inverted-U with a model of innovation that has productive and strategic patents. Empirically, we observe more strategic patents where the model predicts: among inventors in fields of rapid development and where divisional applications are employed. These findings have important implications for our understanding of growth, innovation, intellectual property policy, and patent valuation.

Suggested Citation

Abrams, David S. and Akcigit, Ufuk and Grennan, Jillian, Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption? (November 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19647, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2355653

David S. Abrams (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Ufuk Akcigit

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 E. 59th St
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.ufukakcigit.com

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Jillian Grennan

Santa Clara University, Leavey School of Business ( email )

Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States

Santa Clara University School of Law ( email )

500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States

University of California, Berkeley, Haas School of Business, Institue for Business and Social Impact

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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