Organizational Slack, CEO Turnover and the Horizon Problem in China

58 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2013 Last revised: 15 Mar 2016

Martin J. Conyon

Lancaster University - Management School; Wharton School, Center for Human Resources

Junxiong Fang Sr.

Fudan University - School of Management

Lerong He

State University of New York (SUNY) College at Brockport; Fuzhou University

Date Written: March 10, 2016

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of the horizon effect on organizational slack in China. Using data on Chinese publicly traded firms between 2003 and 2011, we find that organizational slack is significantly higher in the last two years of CEO tenure compared to previous years. In addition, organizational slack in the CEOs terminal years is lower when the board of directors is more independent, when CEO equity ownership is higher, when the firm is privately controlled instead of a state-owned enterprise, and when product market competition is more intense. Our findings indicate that high quality corporate governance mechanisms ameliorate the perverse incentives associated with the horizon problem. We also find that organizational slack during the CEOs final years in office varied by type of CEO turnover. Voluntary turnovers give rise to more organizational slack and rent extraction. We find little evidence that organizational slack is a substitute for executive compensation or has value-enhancing incentive effects. Instead, we show that organizational slack in the CEOs final years in office is associated with significantly lower current and future firm performance.

Keywords: Horizon effect; Corporate Governance; China

JEL Classification: G3

Suggested Citation

Conyon, Martin J. and Fang, Junxiong and He, Lerong, Organizational Slack, CEO Turnover and the Horizon Problem in China (March 10, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2355744 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2355744

Martin J. Conyon (Contact Author)

Lancaster University - Management School ( email )

Bailrigg
Lancaster, LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

Wharton School, Center for Human Resources ( email )

3600 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Junxiong Fang Sr.

Fudan University - School of Management ( email )

No. 670, Guoshun Road
No.670 Guoshun Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

Lerong He

State University of New York (SUNY) College at Brockport ( email )

Brockport, NY 14420
United States

Fuzhou University ( email )

fuzhou, 350000
China

Paper statistics

Downloads
181
Rank
136,071
Abstract Views
926