Optimal Issuance under Information Asymmetry and Accumulation of Cash Flows
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 164
Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 13-12
45 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2013 Last revised: 20 Jul 2016
Date Written: July 18, 2016
Abstract
We study the optimal timing of security issuance to finance a new project when the firm's assets in place have unobservable quality. Stochastic cash flows generated by assets in place reveal information about their quality and simultaneously reduce the required outside funding. A high-quality firm optimally delays issuance unless its accumulated cash or the market belief about its quality is sufficiently high. A low-quality firm does the same and, additionally, issues if market belief and accumulated cash are sufficiently low. Under stated restrictions, the renegotiation-proof optimal security pays outside investors in full before paying anything to original shareholders.
Keywords: dynamic information asymmetry, financing, cash flow accumulation, issuance delay, optimal security
JEL Classification: G31, G32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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