Health Status, Disability and Retirement Incentives in Belgium

41 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2013

See all articles by Alain Jousten

Alain Jousten

University of Liege; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Netspar; International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Mathieu Lefebvre

University of Liege - Research Center on Public and Population Economics

Sergio Perelman

University of Liège - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 18, 2013

Abstract

Many Belgian retire well before the statutory retirement age. Numerous exit routes from the labor force can be identified: old‐age pensions, conventional early retirement, disability insurance, and unemployment insurance are the most prominent ones. We analyze the retirement decision of Belgian workers adopting an option value framework, and pay special attention to the role of health status. We estimate probit models of retirement using data from SHARE. The results show that health and incentives matter in the decision to exit from the labor market. Based on these results, we simulate the effect of potential reforms on retirement.

Suggested Citation

Jousten, Alain and Lefebvre, Mathieu and Perelman, Sergio, Health Status, Disability and Retirement Incentives in Belgium (November 18, 2013). Netspar Discussion Paper No. 11/2013-056, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2356943 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2356943

Alain Jousten (Contact Author)

University of Liege ( email )

Place des Orateurs 3
Batiment B31
4000 Liege
Belgium
+32 4 366 3198 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Netspar

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Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

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Washington, DC 20431
United States

Mathieu Lefebvre

University of Liege - Research Center on Public and Population Economics ( email )

B-4000 Liege
Belgium

Sergio Perelman

University of Liège - Department of Economics ( email )

7 Boulevard du Rectorat
Batiment B31
4000 Liege
Belgium
+32 4 156 3098 (Phone)
+32 4 156 2958 (Fax)

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