Tax Competition and Federal Equalization Schemes with Decentralized Leadership

19 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2013  

Emilson Delfino Silva

University of Alberta - Department of Marketing, Business Economics & Law

Date Written: November 18, 2013

Abstract

In a federation featuring decentralized leadership, regional governments compete by setting capital taxes in anticipation of the central government's fiscal-equalization and income-redistribution policies. As a benchmark, it is first demonstrated that the constrained socially optimal allocation satisfies the Pareto efficient conditions; therefore, it may be first best. It is also shown that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the decentralized leadership game is socially optimal. The anticipation of equalization of marginal utilities of public consumption and equalization of marginal utilities of private consumption provides regional governments with correct incentives in the setting of capital taxes.

Keywords: fiscal equalization, income redistribution, capital tax competition, decentralized leadership

JEL Classification: D6, H3, H4, H7

Suggested Citation

Delfino Silva, Emilson, Tax Competition and Federal Equalization Schemes with Decentralized Leadership (November 18, 2013). University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2013‐1318. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2357111 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2357111

Emilson Delfino Silva (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Marketing, Business Economics & Law ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada

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