Natural Openness and Good Government

33 Pages Posted: 18 Jul 2000 Last revised: 18 Oct 2010

See all articles by Shang-Jin Wei

Shang-Jin Wei

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); International Monetary Fund (IMF); Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2000

Abstract

This paper offers a new interpretation of the connection between openness and good governance. Assuming that corruption and bad governance drive out international trade and investment more than domestic trade and investment, a naturally more open economy' as determined by its size and geography would devote more resources to building good institutions and would display lower corruption in equilibrium. In data, naturally more open economies' do exhibit less corruption even after taking into account their levels of development. Residual openness' which potentially includes trade policies is found not to be important once natural openness' is accounted for. Moreover, naturally more open economies' also tend to pay better civil servant salaries relative to their private sector alternatives indicative of the marginal benefit of good governance in a society's revealed preference. These patterns are consistent with the conceptual model.

Suggested Citation

Wei, Shang-Jin, Natural Openness and Good Government (June 2000). NBER Working Paper No. w7765, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=235721

Shang-Jin Wei (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management

Beijing, 100084
China

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
73
Abstract Views
1,346
rank
133,932
PlumX Metrics