Contracting Theory and Accounting
135 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2001
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Contracting Theory and Accounting
Contracting Theory and Accounting
Date Written: January 2001
Abstract
This paper reviews agency theory and its application to accounting issues. I discuss the formulation of models of incentive problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection problems. I review theoretical research on the role of performance measures in compensation contracts, and I compare how information is aggregated for compensation purposes versus valuation purposes. I also review the literature on communication, including models where the revelation principle does not apply so that nontruthful reporting and earnings management can take place. The paper also discusses capital allocation within firms, including transfer pricing and cost allocation problems.
JEL Classification: D82, D23, J33, M41, M46, L29
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Richard Lambert (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-7782 (Phone)
215-573-5463 (Fax)
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