Contracting Theory and Accounting
135 Pages
Posted: 17 Jan 2001
University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department
There are 2 versions of this paper
Date Written: January 2001
Abstract
This paper reviews agency theory and its application to accounting issues. I discuss the formulation of models of incentive problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection problems. I review theoretical research on the role of performance measures in compensation contracts, and I compare how information is aggregated for compensation purposes versus valuation purposes. I also review the literature on communication, including models where the revelation principle does not apply so that nontruthful reporting and earnings management can take place. The paper also discusses capital allocation within firms, including transfer pricing and cost allocation problems.
JEL Classification: D82, D23, J33, M41, M46, L29
Suggested Citation:
Suggested Citation
Lambert, Richard A., Contracting Theory and Accounting (January 2001). JAE Rochester Conference April 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=235800 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.235800
