Transparency 'Footprints' of Central Banks: The Role of Minutes/Voting Records

Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 41, Issue 2, April 2012, 235-247

25 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2013

See all articles by John Diamondopoulos

John Diamondopoulos

Birkbeck College, University of London; European Business School London

Date Written: November 24, 2013

Abstract

In most academic studies the ECB is seen as more transparent than the FED. However, the perception of ECB transparency by the media and market participants is different. This study will examine the role of minutes/voting records as a possible cause of the differences in the perception of transparency between the academics and the media/market participants. As a proxy of how the media/market participants perceive Central Bank transparency, a content/thematic analysis of CNBC video clips was conducted for four central banks – ECB, FED, BOE and BOJ. The result of the study yielded a three-dimensional "footprint" of the importance of minutes/voting records as perceived by the media/market participants. In the ECB’s case, the three-dimensional "footprint" was extrapolated. The three-dimensional "footprint" of the importance of minutes/voting records could be used to value the relative importance of minutes/voting records in transparency/disclosure indexes or as a "quick" proxy for financial markets participants to measure the transparency of Central Banks.

Keywords: Monetary Policy, Transparency

JEL Classification: E52, E58

Suggested Citation

Diamondopoulos, John, Transparency 'Footprints' of Central Banks: The Role of Minutes/Voting Records (November 24, 2013). Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 41, Issue 2, April 2012, 235-247 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2359142

John Diamondopoulos (Contact Author)

Birkbeck College, University of London ( email )

London, WC1E 7HX
United Kingdom
2032399069 (Phone)

European Business School London ( email )

Regent's park
Inner Circle
London, NW1 4NS
United Kingdom
2032399069 (Phone)

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