Private Enforcement Under EU Law: Abuse of Dominance and the Quantification of Lucrum Cessans

Forthcoming in CPI Antitrust Chronicle

11 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2013 Last revised: 26 Nov 2013

See all articles by Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

ABC economics; IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods

Ulrich Schwalbe

University of Hohenheim

Date Written: November 25, 2013

Abstract

This article discusses two elements that the draft EU Directive on actions for damages treats only perfunctorily. The first concerns lucrum cessans or the quantity effect which is found to be of a relatively higher magnitude than the price effect. The second concerns the difficulties of establishing an appropriate counterfactual in the quantification of damage in the context of Article 102 TFEU cases.

Keywords: quantification of damage, damages actions, abuse of dominance, pass-on, passing-on defence, overcharge, private enforcement, lucrum cessans, quantity effect, volume effect, damnum emergens, price effect, compensation, presumption

JEL Classification: K21, K40, L40

Suggested Citation

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. and Schwalbe, Ulrich, Private Enforcement Under EU Law: Abuse of Dominance and the Quantification of Lucrum Cessans (November 25, 2013). Forthcoming in CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2359327

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud (Contact Author)

ABC economics ( email )

Berlin, 10115
Germany
10115 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ABCecon.com

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods ( email )

Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Défense
Paris, La Défense Cedex, 92044
France

Ulrich Schwalbe

University of Hohenheim ( email )

Schloss Hohenheim
Stuttgart, 70593
Germany
+49 (0)711 45922992 (Phone)

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