Unintended Social Consequences of Introducing Electoral Competition

38 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2013 Last revised: 16 Mar 2014

See all articles by Yusaku Horiuchi

Yusaku Horiuchi

Dartmouth College - Department of Government

Daniel Suryadarma

Australian National University (ANU) - Arndt-Corden Department of Economics; SMERU Research Institute

Akhmad Susamto

Universitas Gadjah Mada - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 15, 2014

Abstract

Social scientists have long investigated the roles of citizens’ civic attitudes and associational life in democracies. Yet, it remains to be fully elucidated whether their attitudes and activities not only influence but also are influenced by the political process in democracies. To address this question, we estimate the socio-attitudinal impacts of introducing mayoral elections in post-democratization Indonesia, which started to take place in July 2005. Our identification strategy is to leverage a variation in the timing of the first election. By using a nationwide survey administered in 2006 before or after the first election, we show that citizens who had experienced the first election before the survey was administered were more likely to have pessimistic and non-social attitudes and negative views about their community. We argue that introducing electoral competition under a poor electoral administration may produce unintended negative social consequences, which may hinder the process of democratic consolidation.

Keywords: democratization, civil society, social capital, election timing, natural experiment, Indonesia

JEL Classification: D71; D72

Suggested Citation

Horiuchi, Yusaku and Suryadarma, Daniel and Susamto, Akhmad, Unintended Social Consequences of Introducing Electoral Competition (March 15, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2359597 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2359597

Yusaku Horiuchi (Contact Author)

Dartmouth College - Department of Government ( email )

204 Silsby Hall
HB 6108
Hanover, NH 03755
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.dartmouth.edu/horiuchi/

Daniel Suryadarma

Australian National University (ANU) - Arndt-Corden Department of Economics ( email )

ANU College of Asia and the Pacific
J.G. Crawford Building, #132, Lennox Crossing
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

SMERU Research Institute ( email )

Jl. Pandeglang No. 30
Jakarta, 10310
Indonesia
62 21 31936336 (Phone)
62 21 31930850 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.smeru.or.id

Akhmad Susamto

Universitas Gadjah Mada - Department of Economics ( email )

Jl.Sosio Humaniora No. 1, Bulaksumur
Sleman, DI Yogyakarta 55281
Indonesia
+6281290113275 (Phone)

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