Electoral Budget Cycles Under Non-Democratic Regimes

29 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2013 Last revised: 5 Oct 2015

See all articles by Akhmad Susamto

Akhmad Susamto

Universitas Gadjah Mada - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 25, 2013

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between elections and central government budget balance in countries that are considered to be non-democratic. Using a sample consisting of unbalanced panel data from 29 countries between 1960 and 2006, the essay provides evidence that electoral budget cycles do exist under non-democratic regimes. The relationship between elections and central government budget balance is significant and robust to a number of variations in control variables, estimation models, sample selection criteria and designations of election year dummy. The essay also provides evidence that the persistence of the relationship is driven by countries that are less distant from democracy (i.e. shallow autocracies).

Keywords: Political budget cycle, democracy, autocracy, budget balance

JEL Classification: D72, E62, H62

Suggested Citation

Susamto, Akhmad, Electoral Budget Cycles Under Non-Democratic Regimes (November 25, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2359834 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2359834

Akhmad Susamto (Contact Author)

Universitas Gadjah Mada - Department of Economics ( email )

Jl.Sosio Humaniora No. 1, Bulaksumur
Sleman, DI Yogyakarta 55281
Indonesia
+6281290113275 (Phone)

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