Interim Third-Party Selection in Bargaining

36 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2013 Last revised: 24 Mar 2017

See all articles by Jin Yeub Kim

Jin Yeub Kim

Yonsei University - School of Economics

Date Written: July 22, 2015


Third-party intervention can reduce the risk of conflict in situations where the bargaining failure is due to asymmetric information. In this paper, I consider the selection of a third party in a two-person bargaining problem where each disputant has private information about its relative strength or weakness. I find that the disputants choose the third party that is best for the strong type but worst for the weak type due to the incentive of each disputant to avoid seeming weak to their adversary. The selected third party's intervention entails a higher ex ante chance of conflict than intervention by any other alternative. This paper shows how the process of interim third-party selection can have important consequences for the outcome of a third-party intervention in bargaining.

Keywords: Bargaining, Third-party intervention, Third-party selection, Mechanism design

JEL Classification: C71, C78, D82

Suggested Citation

Kim, Jin Yeub, Interim Third-Party Selection in Bargaining (July 22, 2015). Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 102, 2017, Available at SSRN: or

Jin Yeub Kim (Contact Author)

Yonsei University - School of Economics ( email )

Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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