The Prediction Value

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 13-188/II

28 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2013

See all articles by Maurice Koster

Maurice Koster

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE)

Sascha Kurz

University of Bayreuth

Ines Lindner

Free University Amsterdam

Stefan Napel

University of Bayreuth

Date Written: November 29, 2013

Abstract

We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of v(S) when i cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a consistency property. Every n-player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some semivalues – including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value – can be interpreted in terms of informational importance.

Keywords: influence, voting games, cooperative games, Banzhaf value, Shapley value

JEL Classification: C71, D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Koster, Maurice and Kurz, Sascha and Lindner, Ines and Napel, Stefan, The Prediction Value (November 29, 2013). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 13-188/II, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2361444 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2361444

Maurice Koster (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North-Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.uva.nl/profiel/k/o/m.a.l.koster/m.a.l.koster.html

Sascha Kurz

University of Bayreuth ( email )

Universitätsstr. 30
Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsmathematik
Bayreuth, Bavaria D-95440
Germany
+49 921 55 7353 (Phone)
+49 921 55 7352 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wm.uni-bayreuth.de/index.php?id=sascha

Ines Lindner

Free University Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Stefan Napel

University of Bayreuth ( email )

Universitatsstr 30
Bayreuth, D-95447
Germany

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