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On Minimum Sum Representations for Weighted Voting Games

S. Kurz: On minimum sum representations for weighted voting games, Annals of Operations Research, Volume 196, Nr 1 (2012), Pages 361-369

7 Pages Posted: 1 Dec 2013  

Sascha Kurz

University of Bayreuth

Date Written: February 17, 2012

Abstract

A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the "yea" voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum, where the weights and the quota are restricted to be integers. In Freixas and Molinero (2009) the authors have classified all weighted voting games without a unique minimum sum representation for up to 8 voters.

Here we exhaustively classify all weighted voting games consisting of 9 voters, which do not admit a unique minimum sum integer weight representation.

Keywords: weighted voting, integer representation, minimum sum representation

JEL Classification: C71, C63

Suggested Citation

Kurz, Sascha, On Minimum Sum Representations for Weighted Voting Games (February 17, 2012). S. Kurz: On minimum sum representations for weighted voting games, Annals of Operations Research, Volume 196, Nr 1 (2012), Pages 361-369. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2361865 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2361865

Sascha Kurz (Contact Author)

University of Bayreuth ( email )

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Lehrstuhl f├╝r Wirtschaftsmathematik
Bayreuth, Bavaria D-95440
Germany
+49 921 55 7353 (Phone)
+49 921 55 7352 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wm.uni-bayreuth.de/index.php?id=sascha

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