Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters: A Model and New Evidence on Coups D'Etat

Posted: 19 Aug 2000

See all articles by Ricardo Sanhueza

Ricardo Sanhueza

Universidad de los Andes, Chile - School of Economics and Managerial Sciences

Alexander Galetovic

Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez; Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; University of Padua - CRIEP

Abstract

We present a model of coups in autocracies. Assuming that policy choices cannot be observed but are correlated with the short-run performance of the economy we find that: (a) the threat of a coup disciplines autocrats; (b) coups are more likely in recessions; (c) increasing per capita income has an ambiguous effect on the probability of a coup. The implications of the model are consistent with the evidence. On average, one recession in the previous year increases the probability of a coup attempt by 47 percent. By contrast, the effect of the level of per capita income is weak.

JEL Classification: D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Sanhueza P., Ricardo and Galetovic, Alexander, Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters: A Model and New Evidence on Coups D'Etat. Economics & Politics, Vol. 12, Issue 2, 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=236218

Ricardo Sanhueza P.

Universidad de los Andes, Chile - School of Economics and Managerial Sciences ( email )

Chile

Alexander Galetovic (Contact Author)

Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez ( email )

Peñalolén
Santiago
Chile

Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States

University of Padua - CRIEP ( email )

Padua
Italy

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