The Nucleolus of Large Majority Games

11 Pages Posted: 4 Dec 2013

See all articles by Sascha Kurz

Sascha Kurz

University of Bayreuth

Stefan Napel

University of Bayreuth

Andreas Nohn

University of Turku

Date Written: March 20, 2013

Abstract

For one of the most prominent solution concepts for cooperative TU games, we show that in the weighted case the nucleolus tends to the weights as the number of players increases under very mild conditions. We give a sufficient characterization for the case of coincidence between weights and nucleolus extending results by Peleg for certain subclasses of homogeneous games.

Keywords: nucleolus, power, limit behavior, weighted voting games

JEL Classification: C61, C71

Suggested Citation

Kurz, Sascha and Napel, Stefan and Nohn, Andreas, The Nucleolus of Large Majority Games (March 20, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2362237 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2362237

Sascha Kurz (Contact Author)

University of Bayreuth ( email )

Universit├Ątsstr. 30
Lehrstuhl f├╝r Wirtschaftsmathematik
Bayreuth, Bavaria D-95440
Germany
+49 921 55 7353 (Phone)
+49 921 55 7352 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wm.uni-bayreuth.de/index.php?id=sascha

Stefan Napel

University of Bayreuth ( email )

Universitatsstr 30
Bayreuth, D-95447
Germany

Andreas Nohn

University of Turku ( email )

Turku, 20014
Finland

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