Download This PaperThe Nucleolus of Large Majority Games
11 Pages Posted: 4 Dec 2013
Date Written: March 20, 2013
Abstract
For one of the most prominent solution concepts for cooperative TU games, we show that in the weighted case the nucleolus tends to the weights as the number of players increases under very mild conditions. We give a sufficient characterization for the case of coincidence between weights and nucleolus extending results by Peleg for certain subclasses of homogeneous games.
Keywords: nucleolus, power, limit behavior, weighted voting games
JEL Classification: C61, C71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kurz, Sascha and Napel, Stefan and Nohn, Andreas, The Nucleolus of Large Majority Games (March 20, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2362237 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2362237
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