Combining Rational Choice and Evolutionary Dynamics: The Indirect Evolutionary Approach

Posted: 13 Feb 2001

See all articles by Wieland Müller

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE; Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER

Manfred Königstein

University of Erfurt

Abstract

In this study we propose a formal framework for the indirect evolutionary approach initiated by Guth and Yaari. It allows us to endogenize preferences and to study their evolution. We define two-player indirect evolutionary games with observable types and show how to incorporate symmetric as well as asymmetric situations. We show how to apply solution concepts that are well known from game theory and evolutionary game theory to solve these games. For illustration we include two examples.

JEL Classification: C70

Suggested Citation

Müller, Wieland and Königstein, Manfred, Combining Rational Choice and Evolutionary Dynamics: The Indirect Evolutionary Approach. Metroeconomica, Vol. 51, No. 3, August 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=236274

Wieland Müller (Contact Author)

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, A-1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://https://homepage.univie.ac.at/wieland.mueller/

Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/show/w.mueller-3.htm

Manfred Königstein

University of Erfurt ( email )

Internationales Buro
Nordhaeuser Str. 63
D - 99089 Erfurt
Germany

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