Who Benefits From Minority Business Set-Asides? The Case of New Jersey

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 15, No. 2, 202-226 (1996)

26 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2013

See all articles by Samuel Myers

Samuel Myers

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs

Tsze Chan

Pelavin Research Institute

Date Written: December 6, 2013

Abstract

Race-based remedies often are justified by evidence of prior discrimination. They work when they benefit groups previously disadvantaged. This article examines one such remedy-minority business set-asides-and its application in the award of public procurement and construction contracts by the state of New Jersey. Analyzed are contract awards to minority and non-minority/non-women-owned business enterprises in 1990, as well as in periods before, during, and after the imposition of a state minority set-aside program. Using a conventional decomposition approach, the article reveals significant discriminatory gaps in the success of minority- versus non-minority-owned firms in obtaining contracts from the state of NewJersey. The analysis suggests that minority contracting success rates fell from the pre-set-aside era to the set-aside era and that discriminatory outcomes persisted. The particular remedy chosen - while justified based on evidence of prior discrimination - appears not to have reduced the original discrimination nor did it unambiguously benefit minority businesses.

Keywords: minority business, New Jersey, discrimination, benefits, minority, non-minority

Suggested Citation

Myers, Samuel and Chan, Tsze, Who Benefits From Minority Business Set-Asides? The Case of New Jersey (December 6, 2013). Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 15, No. 2, 202-226 (1996). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2364603

Samuel Myers (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs ( email )

301 19th Ave S
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

Tsze Chan

Pelavin Research Institute

3333 K. Street, N.W., #300
Washington, DC 20007
United States

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