Impact of Risk Aversion and Belief Heterogeneity on Trading of Defaultable Claims

30 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2013 Last revised: 28 Oct 2015

See all articles by Jinbeom Kim

Jinbeom Kim

Barclays

Tim Leung

University of Washington - Department of Applied Math

Date Written: December 6, 2013

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of pricing and trading of defaultable claims among investors with heterogeneous risk preferences and market views. Based on the utility-indifference pricing methodology, we construct the bid-ask spreads for risk-averse buyers and sellers, and show that the spreads widen as risk aversion or trading volume increases. Moreover, we analyze the buyer's optimal static trading position under various market settings, including (i) when the market pricing rule is linear, and (ii) when the counterparty -- single or multiple sellers -- may have different nonlinear pricing rules generated by risk aversion and belief heterogeneity. For defaultable bonds and credit default swaps, we provide explicit formulas for the optimal trading positions, and examine the combined effect of risk aversions and beliefs. In particular, we find that belief heterogeneity, rather than the difference in risk aversion, is crucial to trigger a trade.

Keywords: indifference pricing, heterogeneous beliefs, risk aversion, credit risk, trading volume

JEL Classification: G12, G13, C68

Suggested Citation

Kim, Jinbeom and Leung, Tim, Impact of Risk Aversion and Belief Heterogeneity on Trading of Defaultable Claims (December 6, 2013). Annals of Operation Research, 2014, DOI: 10.1007/s10479-013-1524-z, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2364641 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2364641

Jinbeom Kim (Contact Author)

Barclays ( email )

745 7th avenue, NY 10019
United States

Tim Leung

University of Washington - Department of Applied Math ( email )

Lewis Hall 217
Department of Applied Math
Seattle, WA 98195
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.washington.edu/timleung/

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
156
Abstract Views
1,168
Rank
384,045
PlumX Metrics