Diverse Behavior Patterns in a Symmetric Society with Voluntary Partnerships

48 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2013

See all articles by Takako Fujiwara-Greve

Takako Fujiwara-Greve

Keio University - Faculty of Economics

Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara

University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 1, 2013

Abstract

In the literature of voluntarily repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, the focus is on how long-term cooperation is established, when newly matched partners cannot know the past actions of each other. In this paper we investigate how non-cooperative and cooperative players co-exist. In many incomplete information versions of a similar model, inherently non-cooperative players are assumed to exist in the society, but their long-run fitness has not been analyzed. In reality and in experiments, we also observe that some people are cooperative, while others never cooperate. We show that a bimorphic equilibrium of the most cooperative strategy and the most myopic strategy exists for sufficiently high survival rate of players, and that it is evolutionarily stable under uncoordinated mutations. For lower survival rates, adding initial periods of defection makes similar bimorphic equilibria. Both types of equilibria confirm persistence of defectors.

Keywords: Diversity, evolution, voluntary separation, repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

JEL Classification: C73

Suggested Citation

Fujiwara-Greve, Takako and Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro, Diverse Behavior Patterns in a Symmetric Society with Voluntary Partnerships (October 1, 2013). Tokyo Center for Economic Research (TCER) Paper No. E-62, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2364691

Takako Fujiwara-Greve (Contact Author)

Keio University - Faculty of Economics ( email )

2-15-45 Mita, Ninato-ku
Tokyo 1088345
Japan

Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara

University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics ( email )

7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku
Tokyo 113-0033
Japan

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