The Survival Value of Assuming Others to Be Rational

Posted: 11 Sep 2000

See all articles by Johan Stennek

Johan Stennek

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract

I study the evolution of rationality, using an indirect evolutionary approach, in which nature selects a decision-making procedure, and the procedure chooses actions in matching-games. The main result is that in order for (knowledge of) rationality to survive, it is necessary and sufficient that the rational procedure respects the attraction principle. That is, when a rational agent eliminates a strictly dominated action A, he should only increase the choice probability of the actions actually dominating A and not change the choice probability of other undominated actions. The attraction principle sharpens gametheoretic predictions. Attraction effects have been verified in psychological experiments.

Keywords: Evolutionary Psychology, Rationality, Beliefs

JEL Classification: C70, D90

Suggested Citation

Stennek, Johan, The Survival Value of Assuming Others to Be Rational. International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 29, Issue 2, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=236477

Johan Stennek (Contact Author)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 665 4536 (Phone)
+46 8 665 4599 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
435
PlumX Metrics