A Unified Social Ontology

32 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2013

See all articles by Francesco Guala

Francesco Guala

Università degli Studi di Milano - Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods

Frank A. Hindriks

Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte

Date Written: December 1, 2013

Abstract

Current debates in social ontology are dominated by approaches that view institutions either as rules or as equilibria of strategic games. We argue that these two approaches can be unified within an encompassing theory based on the notion of correlated equilibrium. We show that in a correlated equilibrium each player follows a regulative rule of the form "if X then do Y". We then criticize Searle’s claim that constitutive rules of the form "X counts as Y in C" are fundamental building blocks for institutions, showing that such rules can be derived from regulative rules by introducing new institutional terms. Institutional terms are introduced for economy of thought, but are not necessary for the creation of social reality.

Keywords: institutions, rules, equilibria

JEL Classification: B4, B52

Suggested Citation

Guala, Francesco and Hindriks, Frank A., A Unified Social Ontology (December 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2365757 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2365757

Francesco Guala (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano - Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods ( email )

via Conservatorio 7
Milano, 20122
Italy

Frank A. Hindriks

Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte ( email )

Groningen
Netherlands

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
81
Abstract Views
598
rank
349,987
PlumX Metrics