Bailouts and Systemic Insurance
29 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2013
Date Written: November 2013
We revisit the link between bailouts and bank risk taking. The expectation of government support to failing banks creates moral hazard - increases bank risk taking. However, when a bank’s success depends on both its effort and the overall stability of the banking system, a government’s commitment to shield banks from contagion may increase their incentives to invest prudently and so reduce bank risk taking. This systemic insurance effect will be relatively more important when bailout rents are low and the risk of contagion (upon a bank failure) is high. The optimal policy may then be not to try to avoid bailouts, but to make them “effective”: associated with lower rents.
Keywords: Banking crisis, Financial intermediation, Moral hazard, Banking systems, Risk management, Economic models, Bailouts, banking crises, systemic risk, contagion, bank resolution, bank risk, bank risk taking, bank monitoring, bank incentives, bank failure, bank capital, deposit insurance, bank regulation, capital regulation, recession, bank profits, bank funding, bank failures, bankrupt, financial crises, bank risks, bank investment, credit booms, bank research, bank risk-taking, interbank market, bank bailouts, bank closure, bank shareholders, financial contagion, crisis management, resolution of banking crises, bank for international settlements, bank owners, bank portfolio
JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation