University of Genoa - Law Department and Centre for Law and Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); EUSFIL Jean Monnet Center of Excellence on Sustainable Finance and Law
This paper contains the European Company Law Experts' response to one of the main issues raised in the European Commission’s Action Plan of 12 December 2012, namely how to make corporate governance codes more effective. The concept of “codes’ effectiveness” has two meanings: effectiveness of the comply-explain mechanism (disclosure effectiveness) and level of adoption of the codes’ recommendations themselves (substantive effectiveness). The ECLE believes that it is of crucial importance to keep the advantages of regulation by codes while finding adequate improvements of the quality of the reports and the explanations. The relationship between the content of corporate governance codes and disclosure is discussed. A “culture of departure from code recommendations”, if well explained, is needed. The quality of corporate governance reports and the explanations should primarily be improved by incentives, but non-legal and legal sanctions may help. Improvements may also be possible by mobilizing private actors and/or by charging public or private agents and agencies with inspection and monitoring.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance Codes, comply or explain, code effectiveness, disclosure, enforcement, European Commission, Action Plan
Böckli, Peter and Davies, Paul L. and Ferran, Eilis and Ferrarini, Guido and Garrido Garcia, José M. and Hopt, Klaus J. and Pietrancosta, Alain and Pistor, Katharina and Roth, Markus and Skog, Rolf R. and Soltysinski, Stanislaw and Winter, Jaap W. and Winter, Jaap W. and Wymeersch, Eddy O., Making Corporate Governance Codes More Effective: A Response to the European Commission's Action Plan of December 2012 (December 11, 2013). Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 56/2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366273 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2366273
European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal
Subscribe to this fee journal for more curated articles on this topic
FOLLOWERS
1,115
PAPERS
11,342
This Journal is curated by:
Marco Da Rin at Tilburg University, Department of Finance, Francesco Giavazzi at University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER)National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)