Beyond Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Supremacy: The Doctrine of Implicit Limits to Constitutional Reform in Latin America

44(3) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 521-534 (2013)

Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Paper No. 116/2017

16 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2013 Last revised: 12 Sep 2017

See all articles by Joel I. Colón-Ríos

Joel I. Colón-Ríos

Victoria University of Wellington - Faculty of Law

Date Written: September 10, 2013

Abstract

This paper provides an introduction to the Latin American doctrine of implicit limits to constitutional reform. The paper begins by discussing the way in which this doctrine relates (and differs) from the doctrine of the basic structure, adopted in several common law jurisdictions such as India and Belize. It then examines a decision of the Constitutional Court of Colombia in which the doctrine of implicit limits received one of its clearest formulations. Finally, it is argued that the Latin American approach goes beyond both parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy, providing the constituent people (as opposed to parliament and the courts) with the final word on the validity of important constitutional changes.

Keywords: parliamentary sovereignty, Latin American constitutionalism, Colombia, unconstitutional constitutional amendents, common law constitutionalism, judicial supremacy, basic structure, constituent power

Suggested Citation

Colón-Ríos, Joel I., Beyond Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Supremacy: The Doctrine of Implicit Limits to Constitutional Reform in Latin America (September 10, 2013). 44(3) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 521-534 (2013); Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Paper No. 116/2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366558

Joel I. Colón-Ríos (Contact Author)

Victoria University of Wellington - Faculty of Law ( email )

PO Box 600
Wellington, 6140
New Zealand

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