Understanding Trust

20 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2013

See all articles by Paola Sapienza

Paola Sapienza

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Anna Toldra‐Simats

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 5 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2013

Abstract

The World Values Survey (WVS) question on trust has been widely used to study the economic effect of trust. Recent work, however, questions its validity as an accurate measure of trust by showing that it is not correlated with the sender's behaviour in the Berg et al. trust game. What measure then should we trust to measure trust? In this article, we argue that the sender's behaviour in a trust game is driven both by beliefs and by preferences. In contrast, WVS‐like measures capture mostly the belief‐based component of a trust game.

Suggested Citation

Sapienza, Paola and Toldra‐Simats, Anna and Zingales, Luigi, Understanding Trust (December 2013). The Economic Journal, Vol. 123, Issue 573, pp. 1313-1332, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2367572 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12036

Paola Sapienza (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management - Department of Finance ( email )

Evanston, IL 60208
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Anna Toldra‐Simats

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

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Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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United Kingdom

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