vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers (Appendix)

15 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2013

See all articles by Serge Moresi

Serge Moresi

Charles River Associates (CRA)

Steven C. Salop

Georgetown University Law Center

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

This Appendix supplements the technical analysis in the Moresi and Salop Vertical GUPPI article published in the Antitrust Law Journal.

The paper "vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers" to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2085999

Keywords: antitrust review of vertical mergers, input foreclosure, upward pricing pressure

JEL Classification: K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Moresi, Serge and Salop, Steven C., vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers (Appendix) (2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2368872 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2368872

Serge Moresi

Charles River Associates (CRA) ( email )

1201 F Street, NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004
United States
(202)662-3847 (Phone)

Steven C. Salop (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
202-662-9095 (Phone)
202-662-9497 (Fax)

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