Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment

36 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2013

See all articles by Maria Montero

Maria Montero

University of Nottingham - School of Economics

Alex Possajennikov

University of Nottingham - School of Economics

Martin Sefton

University of Nottingham - School of Economics

Theodore Turocy

University of East Anglia (UEA)

Date Written: December 17, 2013

Abstract

We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The winner of the game is the player who wins the battlefields with highest total value. We focus on the case where there is one large and several small battlefields, such that a player wins if he wins the large and any one small battlefield, or all the small battlefields. We compute the mixed strategy equilibrium for these games and compare this with choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share of the resources of the players, and that most of the time resources should be spread over more battlefields than are needed to win the game. We find support for the main qualitative features of the equilibrium. In particular, strategies that spread resources widely are played frequently, and the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share in the treatment where the asymmetry between battlefields is stronger.

Keywords: Colonel Blotto, majoritarian contests, experiment

JEL Classification: C72, C91, D72

Suggested Citation

Montero, Maria and Possajennikov, Alex and Sefton, Martin and Turocy, Theodore, Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment (December 17, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2369056 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2369056

Maria Montero (Contact Author)

University of Nottingham - School of Economics ( email )

Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Econ.
University Park
Nottingham NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

Alex Possajennikov

University of Nottingham - School of Economics ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/~lezap/

Martin Sefton

University of Nottingham - School of Economics ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

Theodore Turocy

University of East Anglia (UEA) ( email )

Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
60
Abstract Views
4,562
Rank
649,168
PlumX Metrics