Strategic Interaction vs. Regulatory Compliance Among Regulated Utilities: The Swedish Water Sector

30 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2013 Last revised: 18 Dec 2017

See all articles by Erik Lundin

Erik Lundin

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Date Written: December 17, 2013

Abstract

This study provides the first empirical test of strategic interactions in the pricing decisions of regulated utilities. Since publicly owned water utilities in Sweden are governed by a cost-of-service regulation, prices in neighboring municipalities should not affect the own price other than through spatially correlated cost factors. In contrast, spatial dependence is pronounced. This behavior can be explained in terms of an informal yardstick competition: When consumers use neighboring utilities´ prices as benchmarks for costs or as behaviorally based reference prices, utilities will face the risk of consumer complaints and successive regulatory reviews if deviating too much from neighbors´ prices.

Keywords: yardstick competition, spatial econometrics, public economics, utilities

JEL Classification: D40, L10, L50, L90

Suggested Citation

Lundin, Erik, Strategic Interaction vs. Regulatory Compliance Among Regulated Utilities: The Swedish Water Sector (December 17, 2013). IFN Working Paper No. 998. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2369834 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2369834

Erik Lundin (Contact Author)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden
+46707525847 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.eriklundin.org

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