The Limits of Governmental Intervention: Some Ways How Government Belongs in the Bedroom and Nursery

20 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2013 Last revised: 5 Mar 2014

See all articles by Konstantin Yanovskiy

Konstantin Yanovskiy

Shomron Center for Economic Policy Research

Daniel Shestakov

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Sergei Zhavoronkov

Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy

Date Written: December 20, 2013

Abstract

The paper is focusing on incentives to marry and to give birth under modern institutions of "marital rape" and "actions in the best interest of the child". We suppose the civil bureaucrats and "leftist politicians (formally defined) are in strong demand of these institutions providing more discretionary power and producing more budget depended women. The case studies and statistical analysis show, that following hypotheses: Marital rape institution undermines incentives to establish family (to marry); Marital rape and "best interest of the child" institution weakens family institution and, correspondingly, undermines incentives to give more births couldn't be rejected.

Keywords: demand for depended woman, discretionary power, due process of law, incentives to marry, incentives to give birth, best interest of the child

JEL Classification: D72, D78, J12, J13, J18

Suggested Citation

Yanovskiy, Konstantin (Moshe) and Shestakov, Daniel and Zhavoronkov, Sergei, The Limits of Governmental Intervention: Some Ways How Government Belongs in the Bedroom and Nursery (December 20, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2370281 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2370281

Konstantin (Moshe) Yanovskiy (Contact Author)

Shomron Center for Economic Policy Research ( email )

Kley Shir 8
Karney Shomron, 44855

Daniel Shestakov

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Sergei Zhavoronkov

Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy ( email )

3-5 Gazetny Lane
Moscow, 125009
Russia

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