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Media Competition and Electoral Politics

TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-024

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2013-072,

39 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2013

See all articles by Amedeo Piolatto

Amedeo Piolatto

Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Barcelona Institute of Economics

Florian Schuett

KU Leuven - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 3, 2013

Abstract

We build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation, media slant, and selection of politicians. Media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant. Citizens derive utility from following a rule that maximises their group's welfare. The rule specifies whether to vote and consume news. Our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout. We also provide insights about the impact of competition on the most competent candidate's chance of election.

Keywords: D72, L82

JEL Classification: Demand for news, Electoral turnout, Group-rule utilitarianism, Media bias

Suggested Citation

Piolatto, Amedeo and Schuett, Florian, Media Competition and Electoral Politics (December 3, 2013). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-024, CentER Discussion Paper No. 2013-072,, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2371105 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2371105

Amedeo Piolatto (Contact Author)

Autonomous University of Barcelona ( email )

Department of Economics and Economic History
Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/piolatto/

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

Carrer de Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Barcelona Institute of Economics ( email )

c/ John M. Keynes, 1-11
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Florian Schuett

KU Leuven - Department of Economics ( email )

Leuven
Belgium

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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