Private Pre-Decision Information, Performance Measure Congruity and the Value of Delegation
Contemporary Accounting Research , Vol. 17 Winter 2000 pp. 561-587
34 Pages Posted: 12 Sep 2000 Last revised: 8 Sep 2017
Date Written: December 1, 2000
We use a linear contracting framework to study how the relation between performance measures used in an agent's incentive contract and the agent's private pre-decision information affects the value of delegating decision rights to the agent. The analysis relies on the idea that available performance measures are often imperfect representations of the economic consequences of managerial actions and decisions, and this, along with gaming possibilities provided to the agent by access to private pre-decision information, may overwhelm any benefits associated with delegation. Our analytical framework allows us to derive intuitive conditions under which delegation does and does not have value, and to provide new insights into the linkage between imperfections in performance measurement and agency costs.
Keywords: Private pre-decision information, Performance measure congruity, Delegation
JEL Classification: D82, M12, L22, J33
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation