Legal Challenges to Delayed Arbitral Awards

Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal Vol. 6 No.2 pp. 153-186, November 2013

34 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2014

See all articles by Stephan Wilske

Stephan Wilske

Heidelberg University; Leibniz Universität Hannover; German University for Administrative Sciences Speyer

Date Written: November 28, 2013

Abstract

A common (but not always justified) criticism of arbitration is that arbitral tribunals take too long to render awards. Indeed, there are cases where parties had to wait up to four years for an arbitral award after the close of proceedings. Any such significant delay will have a negative effect on the quality of the arbitral award. This article will analyze whether a significant delay could also affect the legal validity and enforceability of an arbitral award. Rarely do national arbitration laws and arbitration rules by arbitral institutions explicitly stipulate time limits for the making of an arbitral award. If such a time limit is set, often the consequences of non-compliance with such a time limit are set as well. However, in the absence of such an explicit time limit in a national arbitration law, the arbitration rules or party agreement, both the New York Convention as well as the UNCITRAL Model Law leave room for legal recourse against a late arbitral award. Thus, arbitrators are well advised to render an arbitral award within a reasonable period of time after the last hearing. Otherwise they risk the possibility that the award will not be enforceable (and that they might face not only reputational damages, but in the worst case even personal liability).

Keywords: delayed arbitral award, delay, New York Convention, UNCITRAL Model Law, enforceability of arbitral award, time limit, party agreement, personal liability, public policy, inability to present the case, quality of arbitral award

Suggested Citation

Wilske, Stephan, Legal Challenges to Delayed Arbitral Awards (November 28, 2013). Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal Vol. 6 No.2 pp. 153-186, November 2013 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2372088

Stephan Wilske (Contact Author)

Heidelberg University ( email )

Grabengasse 1
Heidelberg, 69117
Germany

Leibniz Universität Hannover ( email )

Welfengarten 1
D-30167 Hannover, 30167
Germany

German University for Administrative Sciences Speyer

Freiherr vom Stein Strasse 2
Freiherr vom Stein Strasse 2
Speyer, D-67346
Germany

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