Wedges, Wages, and Productivity Under the Affordable Care Act

60 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2013

See all articles by Casey B. Mulligan

Casey B. Mulligan

University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Trevor Gallen

University of Chicago

Date Written: December 2013

Abstract

Our paper documents the large labor market wedges created by taxes, subsidies, and regulations included in the Affordable Care Act. The law changes terms of trade in both goods and factor markets for firms offering health insurance coverage. We use a multi-sector (intra-national) trade model to predict and quantify consequences of the Affordable Care Act for the patterns of output, labor usage, and employee compensation. We find that the law will significantly redistribute from high-wage workers to low-wage workers and to non-workers, reduce total factor productivity about one percent, reduce per-capita labor hours about three percent (especially among low-skill workers), reduce output per capita about two percent, and reduce employment less for sectors that ultimately pay employer penalties.

Suggested Citation

Mulligan, Casey B. and Gallen, Trevor, Wedges, Wages, and Productivity Under the Affordable Care Act (December 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19771. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2372482

Casey B. Mulligan (Contact Author)

University of Chicago ( email )

1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
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773-702-9017 (Phone)
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Trevor Gallen

University of Chicago ( email )

No Address Available

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