The Governance Modes of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Emissions Trading System

Hitotsubashi Invited Fellow Program Discussion Paper No. 26

27 Pages Posted: 30 Dec 2013

See all articles by Stefan Niederhafner

Stefan Niederhafner

Seoul National University - Department of PoliSci & IR

Date Written: December 1, 2013

Abstract

Since 2010, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) is running an emissions trading system (ETS), which is one of the metropolis’ main policies to mitigate CO2 emissions. The system has several specific features, which make it unique among the few existing Kyoto Protocol related ETS. It is basically covering only one city, it addresses energy consumption rather than energy production, and it appears to be very successful. According to the TMG, CO2 reductions of over 20% were already achieved. The paper describes the design of the TMG ETS and analyses the reasons for its performance. Applying an analytical governance perspective, the paper shows that the Tokyo system combines elements of several governance modes, of which a network governance component appears to be most relevant for the system’s good performance. In contrast, the market-based elements play a rather secondary role. Against this backdrop it is argued that this case could provide useful information for other territories, including but not limited to other cities, which have problems to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.

Keywords: emissions trading, governance modes, metropolitan governance, greenhouse gas mitigation, Tokyo

JEL Classification: F00, R00

Suggested Citation

Niederhafner, Stefan, The Governance Modes of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Emissions Trading System (December 1, 2013). Hitotsubashi Invited Fellow Program Discussion Paper No. 26. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2372597 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2372597

Stefan Niederhafner (Contact Author)

Seoul National University - Department of PoliSci & IR ( email )

Seoul
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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