Oligopoly, Uncertain Demand, and Forward Markets
10 Pages Posted: 1 Jan 2014 Last revised: 27 Jan 2014
Date Written: January 11, 1990
Abstract
This paper analyzes the Nash equilibrium behavior of risk-averse oligopolistic firms under uncertain demand. It is shown that in the presence of unbiased forward markets the Nash Equilibrium (NE) output increases, that is, forward markets enhance competition. Unlike the competitive or monopoly cases, here the introduction of an unbiased forward market may result in a (unique) NE in which all the firms are worse off.
Keywords: Oligopoly, Forward Markets, Nash equilibrium
JEL Classification: G3, G13, G15
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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